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I. INTRODUCTION
This article concerns the procedural problems faced by municipali-
ties that attempt to adopt local land use regulations. Concern for pro-
cedural due process and citizen involvement has led state legislatures to
prescribe detailed, complex procedures for municipalities to follow in
the adoption of local regulations. These procedures may prescribe the
identity of the local governmental bodies included in the zoning enact-
ment process (and responsibilities),1 the type of notice that the munici-
pality must give to interested parties,2 the nature of hearings before the
planning commission and the legislative body,3 the timing of legislative
adoption,4 and the necessary post-adoption procedure, such as recorda-
tion and publication.5 Courts consider some of these procedures fun-
damental, and require strict compliance with their requirements;6 they
find other provisions worth only minimal compliance.
The imposition and strict enforcement of complex statutory proce-
dures for zoning enactments may serve the competing interests of dif-
ferent types of property owners. The owner-developer usually will
have a vested interest in the property's existing zoning classification (or
the lack of one) when a proposed zoning enactment would impose
greater restrictions on future uses of property. The owner-developer
has an interest in learning that a zoning enactment has been proposed,
1. See infra text accompanying notes 95-102.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 103-37.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 138-48.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 153-57.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 104-06.
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knowing the nature and extent of the zoning enactment, and having an
opportunity to debate the merits of the proposal before the planning
commission, the legislative body, or both. The owner-nondeveloper
may have the same interests, but they normally come into play when a
proposed zoning enactment would relax development restrictions.7
The judicial doctrine of strict compliance with statutory procedural
requirements provides a successful legal strategy for owner-developers
who intend to violate applicable local zoning ordinances. Taken to-
gether, the individually-reasonable procedures constitute a long course
of low hurdles that a municipality seldom clears without error.' After
owner-developers successfully challenge zoning ordinances on grounds
of improper adoption procedures, they can proceed with development
free of local land use and development controls. Therefore, owner-de-
velopers use procedural challenges to the adoption process as a defense
to a municipal prosecution of a zoning violation, a basis for seeking an
injunction against prospective enforcement action, a basis for request-
ing a writ of mandamus to issue a zoning permit when restrictive
amendments have been adopted improperly, or a basis for requesting a
declaratory judgment that a zoning ordinance is totally invalid.
This article first examines the approach of the Supreme Court of
Vermont to procedural challenges to zoning enactments. The court's
decisions have had a negative impact on local planning and zoning ef-
forts in Vermont, as evidenced by its invalidation of seven municipal
zoning bylaws or subdivision ordinances because of procedural defi-
ciencies in the adoption process.9 Similarly, lower Vermont courts
have invalidated zoning bylaws in at least six municipalities for proce-
dural deficiencies.10 Furthermore, an independent evaluation of the
adoption process in a sampling of thirty-six municipalities indicates
that only eight had adopted comprehensive plans properly, and that
only one had successfully followed, with appropriate documentation,
the required process when adopting its zoning bylaw. The article next
compares the approach of Vermont courts with that of courts nation-
wide, and assesses the extent of the negative impact of the judicial doc-
trine of strict compliance on planning and zoning efforts throughout
the country. This is followed by an examination of the judicial doc-
trines and statutes that some states have developed to limit the vulnera-
7. See, e.g., text accompanying note 155 (manner of post-adoption recordation).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 40-55.
10. See infra text accompanying note 63.
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bility of zoning ordinances to attacks based upon improper adoption.
The article concludes with an evaluation of these judicial and legisla-
tive remedies for their possible application in jurisdictions that require
strict compliance with statutory procedural adoption requirements. 1'
II. VERMONT APPROACH
The current approach of Vermont courts toward procedural defi-
ciencies in the adoption, amendment and repeal of comprehensive mu-
nicipal plans and municipal zoning and subdivision bylaws has evolved
through a series of Vermont Supreme Court decisions beginning in
1957. These decisions, reviewed in this section, establish the rationale
for the strict statutory compliance requirement, and indicate the extent
to which courts have applied this standard in Vermont.
Vermont courts acknowledge that the state delegates power to mu-
nicipalities to adopt regulations. 2 Municipalities are "created for the
purpose of performing such governmental functions as the states might
devolve upon [them, and their] ... sovereignty is restricted to specific
governmental functions confided to [them] by the legislature."' 13 Ac-
cordingly, the Vermont Supreme Court has stated that the "power of a
municipality to accomplish zoning exists by virtue of authority dele-
gated from the state, and may be exercised only in accordance with
that delegation, subject to any terms and conditions imposed by the
state."" 4 The Court recognized that "the restrictions of zoning ordi-
nances authorized by statute are in derogation of... common law
[property rights] and should be strictly construed."' 5 The court re-
cently has reiterated this underlying basis of zoning law. 6
In earlier challenges to the validity of particular zoning bylaws, the
court inquired whether the bylaw complied generally with the appro-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 71-72.
12. See, e.g., State v. Sanguinetti, 141 Vt. 349, 353, 449 A.2d 922, 925 (1982) (state
authorizes municipalities to regulate zoning subject to the terms and conditions of the
statute).
13. Thompson v. Smith, 119 Vt. 488, 498, 129 A.2d 638, 645 (1957).
14. Sanguinetti, 141 Vt. at 353, 449 A.2d at 925.
15. In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 365, 140 A.2d 11, 14 (1958).
16. See, e.g., Town of Westford v. Kilburn, 131 Vt. 120, 126, 300 A.2d 523, 527
(1973) (struck portion of statute failing to comply with enabling act); Town of Milton v.
LeClaire, 129 Vt. 495, 498, 282 A.2d 834, 836 (1971) (vote meeting requirements
strictly construed). The court reiterated this standard in Kalakowski v. Town of Clar-
endon, 139 Vt. 519, 522, 431 A.2d 478, 479-80 (1981).
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priate state statutes. 7 Then, in 1970, a majority of the court stated
that "strict compliance ... is the rule if a municipality is to have the
right to exercise zoning authority." 8 The court continues to require
strict compliance with the enabling statute. 9 The Vermont legislature
recently superceded this judicial doctrine of strict compliance with a
statutory revision that specifically requires courts to uphold the bylaw
"if there has been substantial compliance with the procedural require-
ments" of the statute.2'
When reviewing zoning regulations for strict compliance with the
enabling statute, the court has stated that municipalities must comply
with provisions of the enabling statute.2" In Richter, a majority of the
court required strict compliance with procedural requirements of the
enabling statute.2 2 The court had set forth the necessity for compli-
17. See, e.g., Kilburn, 131 Vt. at 122, 300 A.2d at 524. For example, in Thompson
the court stated that a municipality must "pursu[e] correctly the authority conferred
upon it by the enabling legislation." 119 Vt. at 499, 129 A.2d at 645. In Town of
Charlotte v. Richter, the court required that there be "[s]ubstantial compliance with...
requirements imposed in the enabling act." 128 Vt. 270, 271, 262 A.2d 444, 445 (1970).
18. Corcoran v. Village of Bennington, 128 Vt. 482, 493, 266 A.2d 457, 465 (1970)
(emphasis added). Although the court cites Richter as precedent for requiring strict
compliance, it appears that the court significantly increased the degree of compliance
required for a zoning bylaw to be held valid. In the prior case of National Advertising
Co. v. Cooley, 126 Vt. 263, 227 A.2d 406 (1967), Chief Justice Holden in dissent first set
forth the standard of strict compliance. Id. at 273, 227 A.2d at 412 (Holden, C.J.
dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Galanes v. Town of Battleboro, 136 Vt. 235, 240, 388 A.2d 406, 410
(1978); Town of Waterford v. Pike Industries, Inc., 135 Vt. 193, 195-96, 373 A.2d 528,
530 (1977); LeClaire, 149 Vt. at 498, 282 A.2d at 836. The court made this clear in
Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 522, 431 A.2d at 479-80. In a subsequent decision that involved
a tax statute, the court required substantial compliance, but specifically distinguished
that case from Kalakowski because "zoning ordinances are in derogation of common
law property rights." Rooney Vermont Associates v. Town of Pownal, 140 Vt. 150,
154, 346 A.2d 733, 735 (1981). The use of the term "substantial compliance' in a
zoning case decided four months before Kalakowski appears to involve an unfortunate
choice of terminology that was clarified in Kalakowski. Walker v. Town of Dorset, 139
Vt. 227, 231-32, 424 A.2d 1078, 1080 (1981). Note, however, that in Town of Mendon
v. Ezzo, 129 Vt. 351, 278 A.2d 726 (1971), a case involving interim zoning regulation,
strict compliance was not required: "[A]s a temporary expedient of limited duration,
[the adoption of a temporary zoning plan] is not to be held to the same procedural
strictures required of the adoption of the final plan." Id. at 357, 278 A.2d at 729.
20. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4494(a) (Supp. 1984). The legislature adopted this
provision in 1982; the Supreme Court of Vermont has not yet construed it. Therefore,
its impact on the direction of prior precedent requiring strict compliance is uncertain.
21. See Flanders Lumber & Bldg. Supply Co. v. Town of Milton, 128 Vt. 38, 46,
258 A.2d 804, 809 (1969).
22. Richter, 128 Vt. at 271, 262 A.2d at 445. Procedural compliance had been
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ance with procedural requirements in Thompson by stating that "the
selectmen [must] have prepared and adopted.., a plan pursuant to the
statutory procedure required....',23  Thus, the court remanded the
Richter case for specific findings of fact concerning procedural compli-
ance with the enabling act.24 Subsequent decisions have continued to
require specific procedural compliance.25
When a municipality has failed to comply strictly with statutorily
required procedures for the adoption, amendment or repeal of a zoning
bylaw, the court has found the bylaw to be void.26 Chief Justice
Holden, in dissent, set forth one rationale for voiding bylaws, explain-
ing that an "ordinance... not constituted according to the mandatory
directives of the [enabling legislation] ... [a]mounts to an unwarranted
assumption of zoning power which the town is not entitled to exer-
cise."27 In challenges to the validity of zoning ordinances, the chal-
lenger can overcome the presumption that the ordinance is valid28
"upon the introduction of evidence tending to show lack of strict com-
pliance with statutory procedures.",29
In most of the zoning cases heard by the Vermont Supreme Court,
parties have stipulated to the facts of the case, facts which generally
show a lack of strict compliance with statutory procedures.30 When,
however, the municipality attempts to enforce a zoning ordinance, it
bears the "burden of procuring a finding, based on sufficient evidence,
specified by Chief Justice Holden in his dissent in National Advertising Co., 126 Vt. at
273, 227 A.2d at 412 (Holden, C.J., dissenting).
23. Thompson, 119 Vt. at 500, 129 A.2d at 646.
24. Richter, 128 Vt. at 271-72, 262 A.2d at 445.
25. See, eg., Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 522, 431 A.2d 479-80; LeClaire, 129 Vt. at 499,
282 A.2d at 836.
26. See, e.g., LeClaire, 129 Vt. at 499-500, 282 A.2d at 836 (invalid adoption); Na-
tional Advertising Co., 126 Vt. at 266-67, 227 A.2d at 408 (invalid repeal).
27. National Advertising Co. 126 Vt. at 273, 227 A.2d at 412 (Holden, C.J., dis-
senting).
28. See, Richter, 128 Vt. at 271, 262 A.2d at 445. Note that a certificate of a munic-
ipal clerk is presumptive evidence of facts stated with regard to adoption procedures.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4474 (1975).
29. Pike Industries, Ina, 135 Vt. at 196, 373 A.2d at 530. Accord Town of Shel-
burne v. Kaelin, 138 Vt. 247, 249, 415 A.2d 194, 196 (1980); Kalakowski v. John A,
Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 226, 401 A.2d 906, 910 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 484, 266 A.2d at 460 (factual issues resolved by a
commissioner); Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 521-23, 431 A.2d at 479-80 (parties agreed that
there was no public hearing).
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that the ordinance was valid. ' 31
Despite the tendency of the Vermont Supreme Court to invalidate
zoning ordinances for deficiencies in the adoption process, the court
has suggested alternatives that would prevent invalidation. In Thomp-
son, the court implied that curative legislation enacted by the Vermont
General Assembly might have been sufficient to "cure, delete and
render innocuous whatever legal infirmities that might have attended
the enactment of the ordinance. ' 32 Nevertheless, such curative legisla-
tion, although adopted by the legislature,33 was not required to save
the zoning ordinance in Thompson. Applying the doctrine of severabil-
ity, the court eliminated the invalid portion of the zoning ordinance.34
The court then found " [e]ach and every statutory prerequisite of the
enactment of the protective zoning ordinance had been accomplished
to give the ordinance the force of law... ."" Thus, severability might
preserve the validity of an ordinance, given an appropriate factual
pattern.
Finally, the court may have left open the possibility that insubstan-
tial procedural errors do not require invalidation. In Town of Milton v.
LeClaire, the town contended that in the absence of pejudice to the
appellant, the alleged procedural errors were not substantial enough to
warrant the invalidation of the ordinance.36 Rather than rule out such
a defense, the court determined that the defect may have been prejudi-
cial and restated the need for strict compliance.37 A defense of insub-
stantial error also was raised in the Kalakowski case.38 While the court
appeared not to rule out such a defense, it held the defense inapplicable
because the parties agreed that the errors were "substantial." 9
The Vermont Supreme Court has decided nine cases involving chal-
lenges to the validity of municipal zoning or subdivision regulations
31. Waterford, 135 Vt. at 195, 373 A.2d at 530.
32. Thompson, 119 Vt. at 506, 129 A.2d at 649. Such curative legislation has been
recongized as effective in curing procedural defects in other municipal endeavors. See,
e.g., Richford Say. Bank & Trust v. Thomas, Ill Vt. 393, 17 A.2d 239 (1941) (tax
assessment).
33. 1955 Vt. Acts No. 341.
34. Thompson, 119 Vt. at 504, 129 A.2d at 646.
35. Id.
36. LeClaire, 129 Vt. at 498, 282 A.2d at 836.
37. Id. at 499, 282 A.2d at 836.
38. Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 524, 431 A.2d at 480-81.
39. Id. at 524, 431 A.2d at 481.
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based on the municipality's failure to comply strictly with statutory
procedural requirements.' In seven of these cases, parties represent-
ing development interests had initiated the procedural challenges. In
five of these cases, the challenges were raised as defenses to a municipal
enforcement action41 or a citizen petition to enjoin construction;42 the
other cases were actions to compel a municipality to issue zoning per-
mits. 43 In one case, the challenger raised the strict compliance issue in
opposition to a change in zoning designations from residential to com-
mercial.44 In the remaining case, it was unclear which party raised the
issue, or whether the court raised it on its own initiative. 45
In each of these cases, however, the court found procedural deficien-
cies, such as: 1) Referral of a bylaw to a party not included within the
statutory procedures; 4" 2) lack of public hearings; 4 3) insufficient time
between public notice and municipal action;48 4) no appointment of a
zoning commission;49 5) lack of preliminary and final reports submit-
ted from a zoning commission to the municipal legislative body; 0 and
6) insufficient warnings prior to adoption. 1 In all but two of these
cases, the court held invalid the adoption, amendment or repeal of the
40. See Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 519, 431 A.2d at 478; Pike Industries, Inc., 135 Vt. at
193, 373 A.2d at 528; LeClaire, 129 Vt. at 495, 282 A.2d at 834; Ezzo, 129 Vt. at 351,
278 A.2d at 726; Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 482, 266 A.2d at 457; Richter, 128 Vt. at 270, 262
A.2d at 444; Flanders, 128 Vt. at 38, 258 A.2d at 804; NationalAdvertising Co., 126 Vt.
at 263, 227 A.2d at 406; Thompson, 119 Vt. at 488, 129 A.2d at 638.
41. See Pike Industries, Inc, 135 Vt. at 193, 373 A.2d at 528; LeClaire, 129 Vt. at
495, 282 A.2d at 834; Ezzo, 129 Vt. at 351, 278 A.2d at 726; Richter, 128 Vt. at 270, 262
A.2d at 444.
42. See Thompson, 119 Vt. at 488, 129 A.2d at 638.
43. See Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 482, 266 A.2d at 457; Flanders, 128 Vt. at 38, 258 A.2d
at 804.
44. See Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 519, 431 A.2d at 478.
45. National Advertising Co., 126 Vt. at 263, 227 A.2d at 406.
46. See Thompson, 119 Vt. at 500, 129 A.2d at 646.
47. See Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 522-23, 431 A.2d at 480; Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 493,
266 A.2d at 465; Richter, 128 Vt. at 271, 262 A.2d at 445; National Advertising Co.,
126 Vt. at 266, 227 A.2d at 407-408.
48. See Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 493, 266 A.2d at 465; Richter, 128 Vt. at 271, 262 A.2d
at 445; Flanders, 128 Vt. at 42, 258 A.2d at 807.
49. Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 492-93, 266 A.2d at 465; Richter, 128 Vt. at 271, 262 A.2d
at 445.
50. Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 492-93, 266 A.2d at 465.
51. LeClaire, 129 Vt. at 498, 282 A.2d at 835 (no title, date of selectmen's approval,
or notification that a copy was posted); Ezzo, 129 Vt. at 356, 278 A.2d at 729 (no brief
summary of principal provisions nor reference to where one could examine copies.
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municipal ordinance.5 2 The development interests prevailed in five of
the seven cases when they raised the issue of procedural deficiencies,53
losing only in the cases involving severability 54  and interim
regulations. 55
The rationale for requiring strict compliance with statutory proce-
dural requirements has two bases. First, the supreme court has ob-
served that zoning regulations are in derogation of common law
property rights.56 The court has implied that when doubt exists about
the validity of a regulation that restricts the use of land, the courts
should resolve the issue in favor of the land owner.57 Second, the court
has stressed that the statutory requirements help ensure procedural due
process. Specifically, the requirements for public hearings on proposed
land use regulations seek the involvement of local government and citi-
zens.5 They also provide an opportunity for interested parties to ex-
press their approval of or objection to the proposed regulations;5 9 the
hearings permit officials to become aware of citizen sentiment and
prompt officials to consider making appropriate revisions.' The notice
requirements also are intended to inform voters of proposed regula-
tions and allow them an opportunity for study and consideration.6"
Voters should be able to rely upon the accuracy of any public notice,
thereby precluding further changes without subsequent notice and pub-
lic hearing. The court has implied that such notice requirements, along
with strict compliance, are necessary to ensure procedural due
process.6 2
52. In Thompson, the court used the doctrine of severability to save the regulations
by severing the portion of the ordinance that had been improperly adopted. See supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text. In Ezzo, the only case involving interim regula-
tions, the court found substantial compliance sufficient. See infra note 55.
53. See Pike Industries, 135 Vt. at 193, 373 A.2d at 528; LeClaire, 129 Vt. at 495,
282 A.2d at 834; Corcoran, 128 Vt. at 482, 266 A.2d at 457; Richter, 128 Vt. at 270, 262
A.2d at 444; Flanders, 128 Vt. at 38, 258 A.2d at 804.
54. See Thompson, 119 Vt. at 488, 129 A.2d at 638.
55. See Ezzo, 129 Vt. at 351, 278 A.2d at 726.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
57. See In re Willey, 120 Vt. at 365, 140 A.2d at 14.
58. Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 523, 431 A.2d at 480.
59. National Advertising Co., 126 Vt. at 273, 227 A.2d at 412 (Holden, C.J., dis-
senting).
60. Kalakowski, 139 Vt. at 523, 431 A.2d at 480-81; Ezzo, 129 Vt. at 357-58, 278
A.2d at 729-30.
61. LeClaire, 129 Vt. at 496-97, 282 A.2d at 835.
62. Ezzo, 129 Vt. at 358, 278 A.2d at 730. The court has invalidated zoning ordi-
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Although the Vermont Supreme Court invalidated zoning and sub-
division regulations in only seven cases, those decisions, along with
guidelines established in related cases, have had a significant impact on
municipal land use controls in Vermont, reaching far beyond the
boundaries of those seven municipalities. Lower Vermont courts have
followed the Vermont Supreme Court's precedent and invalidated zon-
ing regulations in at least six municipalities throughout the state.63
District Environmental Commissions, in deciding cases under Ver-
mont's Land Use and Development Law6 have refused to consider the
provisions of local municipal plans65 in at least two cases. 66 Munici-
palities also have been affected in more subtle and indirect ways.
Towns sometimes have chosen not to enforce their local regulations
rather than have the entire ordinance invalidated when a defendant
challenges the procedures followed in its adoption. Other towns have
converted permanent regulations to interim regulations to maintain
their effectiveness temporarily when procedural adoption deficiencies
have become evident. 68 Efforts to ensure compliance with statutory
procedural requirements have caused municipalities to retain legal
nances based on procedural deficiencies up to twelve years after the process complained
of. See National Advertising Co., 126 Vt. at 264-65, 227 A.2d at 406-07. See also infra
note 179 (examples of invalidation ranging from 10-45 years).
63. WINDHAM REGIONAL PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, MEMO-
RANDUM TO VERMONT SENATE ENERGY AND NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE 2
(January 19, 1982).
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. 151 (1984).
65. Required under VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086 (a) (10) (1984).
66. See District Environmental Commission 3, Application 3W0246-Hawk Moun-
tain Corporation, Nov. 16, 1978, pp. 23-26 (procedural deficiency was the insertion by
the Pittsfield Board of Selectmen of two words into the town plan prior to its adoption,
without resubmission of this plan to the Pittsfield Planning Commission); District Envi-
ronmental Commission 1, Application 1R0291-Pike Industries, Inc. and Kenneth &
Thelma Kellogg, May 15, 1978, pp. 5-8, 10 (procedural deficiencies included: 1) Copies
of proposed town plan sent to adjacent municipalities and government agencies less
than 15 days prior to planning commission's public hearing, and 2) selectmen's public
hearing was held more than 90 days following submission of the proposed plan by the
planning commission.).
67. Stephen Fitch, former Town Manager of Putney, Vermont. Telephone inter-
view Apr. 17, 1984.
68. This is a temporary solution, however, as interim regulations may be valid for a
maximum of three years VT. STAT. ANN. 24, § 4410(a) & (f) (Supp. 1984). It is unclear
whether municipalities may convert to interim regulations if they previously had in-
terim regulations for a three-year period. Moreover, the restrictions under interim reg-
ulations may be less restrictive than they would be under permanent regulations. For
example, the interim regulations classify proposals for uses not permitted by the bylaw
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counsel to supervise the process, and to be overly cautious in comply-
ing with statutory procedures.6 9 The legal costs associated with the
adoption or amendment of municipal land use controls may make
small, fiscally-conservative Vermont communities more reluctant to in-
itiate such efforts.
The actual invalidation of a municipal comprehensive plan or zoning
bylaw undermines the community's efforts at local land planning. Fol-
lowing invalidation, development may proceed unrestrained by local
planning restrictions, at least until the community properly adopts new
regulations. Also, invalidation frustrates the will of the majority of the
municipality's residents that had voted to approve local regulations.
Subsequent public disillusionment with the entire process might stall
the re-adoption of local land use regulations.
The statutory procedural requirements for adoption, amendment or
repeal of local comprehensive plans and zoning and subdivision bylaws
are lengthy and complex.' Part of the language of the statute may be
unclear or ambiguous, which may make its provisions difficult to inter-
pret. Thus, strict compliance becomes a highly problematical goal. A
further problem is inadvertent errors by part-time, untrained municipal
officials who do not realize the importance of strict compliance with
statutory procedures, and, therefore, do not carefully follow the statu-
tory procedures or document each step they take.
An informal survey conducted by the Vermont Natural Resources
Council (V.N.R.C.)7 1 revealed the extent of the problem of strict com-
pliance with statutory procedural requirements. Of the thirty-six com-
munities where the V.N.R.C. reviewed compliance of communities
with statutory procedural requirements for the adoption of local land
use controls, they found seventeen had some degree of procedural defi-
ciency.72 These inadvertent procedural errors, difficult to avoid or
as conditional uses, id. § 4410(d), rather than as a use variance under permanent regula-
tions, theoretically precluded. Id. § 4473.
69. For example, publishing an entire ordinance in a newspaper to preclude later
claims that a "brief summary" was inadequate. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4447
(Supp. 1984).
70. Id. §§ 4384-87, 4403-04.
71. Results of the 1978 survey conducted by the Vermont Natural Resources Coun-
cil. Interview with Darby Bradley, legal counsel to the VNRC, October 18, 1983.
72. This survey studied adoption procedures for comprehensive plans and zoning
bylaws in 36 communities. With regard to the adoption of comprehensive plans, eight
communities (22%) had documented evidence showing compliance with statutory pro-
cedures. Two of the communities followed procedures that might be defective, depend-
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remedy, expose municipal land use regulations to future legal chal-
lenges on the basis of a minor technical deficiency in the adoption pro-
cess. Another problem that became evident through the V.N.R.C.
study is that municipalities often fail to maintain adequate records to
document the procedures they actually followed.73 Thus, even when
municipalities have complied fully with the statutory procedural re-
quirements, they cannot prove they did so. Statutory provisions that
give the municipality the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that it




The attitude of the Vermont courts toward technical, procedural de-
ficiencies in the adoption or amendment of zoning ordinances is not
unique. Courts throughout the country often have shown a similar ju-
dicial distaste for a municipality's failure to follow statutory proce-
dures. This part of the article examines the background for this strict
judicial attitude and surveys the types of procedural deficiencies that
ing upon a court's interpretation of the statutory requirements. With regard to the
adoption of zoning bylaws, only 11 of the 36 communities surveyed had adopted zoning
bylaws. One community (9%) had documented evidence showing compliance with
statutory procedures while six (55%) either had documented evidence showing non-
compliance (four) or had zoning bylaws based on invalid town plans (two). One Com-
munity (9%) followed procedures that might be defective, depending upon a court's
interpretation of the statutory requirements. Noted defects included inadequate public
notice (lack of summary, less than 15 days notice, failure to notify adjoining towns),
failure to notify planning commission of selectmen's hearing, changes made after final
selectmen's hearing, failure of selectmen to hold a public hearing, and improper adop-
tion (failure to adopt, adoption prior to public notice and hearing, adoption before or
after the 60 day period prescribed by statute).
73. With regard to the adoption of comprehensive plans, 16 communities (44%)
had no records that one could examine to determine procedural compliance. With re-
gard to the adoption of zoning bylaws, three communities (27%) had no records that
one could examine to determine procedural compliance.
74. See, eg., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4474 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-
4-1020 (Bums 1981). See also City of Alamogordo v. McGee, 64 N.M. 253, 327 P.2d
321 (1958). Despite the 1974 legislation, one authority was aware of no municipality in
Vermont that had provided a clerk's certificate regarding the procedures used in the
adoption of town plans or zoning bylaws, until compliance by the Windham Regional
Planning and Development Commission in 1981. Interview with William Mitchell,
Chief of Technical Assistance, Department of Housing and Community Affairs, Ver-
mont Agency of Economic Development and Community Affairs (Apr. 6, 1984).
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have resulted in the invalidation of zoning ordinances throughout the
country.
1. Presumption of Validity
In general, courts accord zoning ordinances of local legislative bod-
ies an initial presumption of validity.7" Courts extend this presumption
to the procedural manner by which the municipality adopted the zon-
ing ordinance, if the appropriate officers have signed the ordinance,
and the clerk of the legislative body has certified it. 6 This presump-
tion disappears, however, if a plaintiff provides evidence indicating a
failure to follow statutory procedures properly.
2. Basis for Judicial Review
The review of procedural deficiencies in the adoption of a zoning
ordinance becomes especially important when considering the degree
of procedural noncompliance that courts will tolerate before invalidat-
ing the ordinance. Courts view procedural requirements as one
method of discouraging an arbitrary exercise of power.77 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has set forth two additional reasons
for the primacy of procedural compliance. The first is based on the
theory of delegation of power: "It is implicit that a delegated power
can be exercised only to the extent to which a delegation has been
made, and to the extent that the conditions attached to the grant of
power have been fulfilled." '78 The second rationale is that an exercise of
zoning authority in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of an
enabling act is ultra vires.79
Another often-stated reason for close judicial scrutiny of adoption
procedures is that of an individual's right to procedural due process.
75. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
76. See Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 428, 119 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1954). See
also City of Alamogordo v. McGee, 64 N.M. 253, 259, 327 P.2d 321, 325 (1958) (pre-
passage requirements regarding public hearing of notice thereof are presumed met in
view of presumption of validity as to ordinance and due performance of duty by public
officials).
77. See, e.g., Tonroy v. Lubbock, 242 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
78. 1 RATHKOPH, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 10.01 (4th Ed. 1984)
(citing Hallenborg v. Town Clerk of Billerica, 360 Mass. 513, 517, 275 N.E.2d 525
(1971)).
79. See Town of Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 602-04, 282 N.E.2d 87, 90-91
(1972). See also Hartunian v. Matteson, 109 R.I. 509, 515-16, 288 A.2d 485,489 (1972)
(zoning ordinance expanding or abridging rights granted by enabling act is ultra vires).
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Courts have stated that inadequate statutory procedures or a failure to
comply with appropriate statutory procedures will constitute a denial
of due process of law.8" The applicability of substantive due process
standards to the adoption of zoning ordinances has been questioned, as
ordinance adoption represents a legislative function. Courts have not
been reluctant to apply procedural due process standards, however,
and there is a growing tendency to view some types of zoning activity
as administrative or quasi-judicial."1
3. Applicable Procedural Requirements
The minimal procedures required for the adoption of local zoning
ordinances usually are set forth in state enabling legislation. As noted
below, courts consider these statutory guidelines to be the minimal
standards the enacting body must meet. Local charters or zoning ordi-
nances may specify additional procedural guidelines. Some courts
have held that procedures provided for in a local charter will supercede
conflicting procedures provided by statute, 2 while other courts reach
the opposite result.13 Some courts have held that procedural require-
ments established by local ordinances are mandatory prerequisites,84
while other courts have held such requirements are discretionary. 58
Constitutional provisions and preemptive state law, however, would
limit any such local ordinance provision.8 6 In some states that have
80. See, e.g., Hart v. Bayless Inv. & Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379, 388, 346 P.2d 1101,
1108 (1959); Gilbert v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 384, 391, 60 P.2d 847, 850 (1936);
Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756, 758-59, 141 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1965); American Oil Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 29 Ill. App. 3d 988, 990-93, 331 N.E.2d 67, 69-71 (1975).
81. See Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure: The Complemen-
tary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REv. 753 (1976);
Kahn, In Accordance With A Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zoning
Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1011 (1979).
82. Adler v. City Council of City of Culver City, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 768 n. 1, 7
Cal. Rptr. 805, 808 n. 1 (1960); Thompson v. City of Miami, 167 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla.
1964).
83. See, e.g., Kubik v. City of Chicopee, 535 Mass. 514, 516, 233 N.E.2d 219, 221
(1967); Swinehart v. Borough of Pottstown, 1 Pa. D & C 3d 405, aff'd, 27 Pa. Comm'w.
174, 365 A.2d 909 (1976).
84. See South Jonesboro Civic Ass'n v. Thornton, 248 Ga. 65, 66-67, 281 S.E.2d
507, 508-09 (1981); Paliotto v. Town of Islip, 31 Misc. 2d 447, 453-54, 224 N.Y.S.2d
466, 475-76 (Sup. Ct. 1962) rev'd on other grounds, 122 A.D.2d 930, 256 N.Y.S.2d 58
(1964); Lee v. Simpson, 44 N.C. App. 611, 612, 261 S.E.2d 295, 295-96 (1980).
85. See Durand v. Superintendent of Pub. Bldgs., 354 Mass. 74, 235 NE.2d 550,
551-52 (1968); Pumo v. Borough of Norristown, 404 Pa. 475, 172 A.2d 828, 829 (1961).
86. Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 468, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1972).
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enacted constitutional "home rule" provisions, local procedural re-
quirements may supercede conflicting statutory requirements.8 7
When reviewing procedural errors in the adoption of a local zoning
ordinance, a court must make two determinations. First, the court
must decide whether the procedures violated by the municipality are
mandatory or directory. While courts generally consider procedural
requirements to be mandatory, they may view procedures that are im-
posed by local regulations or charter (as contrasted with those specifi-
cally imposed by statute) as discretionary. Statutory language also
may be unclear regarding whether a specific procedure is required by
the statute or only recommended. Courts may find that although a
statute only recommends a specific provision, nevertheless, due process
requires it. The second and more crucial determination, however, is
the degree of compliance that the court will require of the
municipality.
4. Standard of Review
Courts differ widely in the latitude they allow municipalities in their
efforts to comply with mandatory statutory procedures. Not all proce-
dural defects or irregularities will result in the invalidation of the chal-
lenged zoning ordinances. At one end of the spectrum, some state
courts require strict compliance with mandatory statutory procedural
requirements; any deviation will invalidate the zoning ordinance. As
noted above, some courts base this attitude on procedural due process
considerations, others on the derogation of common law property
rights by zoning requirements."8 On the other hand, some courts only
require substantial compliance with mandatory statutory procedural
requirements. A review of state court decisions indicates that twenty-
three states usually require strict compliance, 9 while eight states re-
See also San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004, reh'g den., 439 U.S. 1135 (1979) (a city may
not add a step to a statutory zoning procedure).
87. Casper v. Hetlage, 359 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo. 1962).
88. Specht v. City of Page, 128 Ariz. 593, 597, 627 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Ct. App. 1981);
Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Green, 447 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Del. 1982).
89. See Summit Properties, Inc. v. Wilson, 26 Ariz. App. 550, 550 P.2d 104 (1976);
Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929); Steiner, Inc. v. Town
Plan. and Zoning Comm'n, 149 Conn. 74, 175 A.2d 559 (1961); Carl M. Freeman As-
sos., Inc. v. Green, 447 A.2d 1179 (Del. 1982); City of Hollywood v. Pettersen, 178 So.
2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); South Jonesboro Civic Assocs., Inc. v. Thornton, 248
Ga. 65, 281 S.E.2d 507 (1981); Citizens for Better Gov't v. County of Valley, 95 Idaho
320, 508 P.2d 550 (1973); Carson v. McDowell, 203 Kan. 40, 452 P.2d 828 (1969);
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quire only substantial compliance.'
What precisely constitutes "substantial" compliance with statutory
requirements is not always clear. One court suggested that conformity
with the spirit of the statutory procedures will be sufficient to hold the
adoption valid.9" Other courts considered prejudice to the plaintiff to
determine whether a defect was substantial. Finally, some states may
require strict compliance with one element of the statutory procedures,
such as notice,9 2 but require only substantial compliance with other
procedures, such as entrance of an ordinance into the town ordinance
book.9 3 One court has held that failure to comply with procedural re-
quirements that are "ministerial" will not invalidate the proceedings.9 4
Regardless of the standard of review utilized by the reviewing court,
the enormous potential for error in zoning enactments becomes appar-
ent through a review of technical procedural deficiencies that have
been used to invalidate zoning ordinances. The next sections examine
Creative Displays, Inc. v. City of Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980); Mills v. City of
Baton Rouge, 210 La. 830, 28 So. 2d 447 (1946); Montgomery v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 256 Md. 597, 261 A.2d 447 (1970); Korash v. City of Livonia, 388 Mich. 737,
202 N.W.2d 803 (1972); State ex rel. Freeze v. City of Cape Girardeau, 523 S.W.2d 123
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Board of Comm'rs v. McNally, 168 Neb. 23, 95 N.W.2d 153
(1959); Mulligan v. City of New Brunswick, 83 N.J. Super. 185, 199 A.2d 82 (1964);
Village of Williston Park v. Israel, 191 Misc. 6, 76 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1948), aftd, 276 A.D.
968, 94 N.Y.S.2d 921, afftd, 301 N.Y. 713, 95 N.E.2d 208 (1950); George v. Town of
Edenton, 31 N.C. App. 648, 230 S.E.2d 695 (1976), rev'd, 294 N.C. 679, 242 S.E.2d 877
(1978); Bruscino Development, Inc. v. Cummings, 118 Ohio App. 199, 193 N.E.2d 736
(1962); Voight v. Saunders, 206 Okla. 318, 243 P.2d 654 (1952); Mazeika v. American
Oil Co., 383 Pa. 191, 118 A.2d 142 (1955); Corcoran v. Village of Bennington, 128 Vt.
482, 266 A.2d 457 (1970); Shelton v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 28, 435 P.2d 949
(1968); Schoeller v. Board of County Comm'rs. 568 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1977).
90. See Lynnwood Property Owners v. Lands Described in Complaint, 359 So.2d
357 (Ala. 1978); Orth v. Board of County Comm'rs, 158 Colo. 540, 408 P.2d 974
(1965); Speilman v. County of Rock Island, 103 11. App. 3d 514, 431 N.E.2d 770
(1982); Town of Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 282 N.E.2d 87 (1972); Itasca County
v. Rodenz, 268 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1978); V.M. Stevens, Inc. v. Town of South Hemp-
ton, 114 N.H. 118, 316 A.2d 179 (1974), modified, 338 A.2d 110 (1975); Nesbit v. City
of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 455, 575 P.2d 1340 (1977); Charlestown Homeowners Ass'n,
Inc. v. LaCoke, 507 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
91. See Jarvis Acres, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 163 Conn. 41, 45-48, 301 A.2d 244,
246-48 (1972).
92. Village of Island Park v. J.E.B. Associates, Inc., 21 Misc. 2d 249, 252, 190
N.Y.S.2d 77, 81 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
93. Northern Operating Corp. v. Town of Ramapo, 26 N.Y.2d 404, 409-10, 311
N.Y.S.2d 286, 290-91, 259 N.E.2d 723, 726-27 (1970).
94. Board of City Comm'rs v. Berner, 5 Kan. App.2d 104, 108-09, 613 P.2d 676,
681 (1980).
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errors in the areas of actors, notice, public hearings, adoption, and
post-adoption activities.
B. Actors
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA)9" required the ap-
pointment of a municipal zoning commission 96 to receive and review
any proposal for an initial zoning ordinance prior to its enactment by
the legislative body. Although the zoning commission's report is advi-
sory only, courts generally have deemed mandatory the statutory re-
quirement that the commission be formed and utilized.97 Courts have
held that failure to comply invalidates the resulting initial zoning
ordinance.98
State enabling acts sometimes require the legislative body to refer a
proposed zoning ordinance or amendment to the municipal planning
commission for its review and recommendation. Courts view this pro-
cedure as mandatory,9 9 and failure to refer will invalidate the resulting
ordinance or amendment.100
Some courts, recognizing the potential extra-municipal impact of lo-
cal zoning ordinances, have given regional or state agencies a limited
power of review over local zoning activities.10 ' Courts also have held
that communities must comply with these requirements.1 0 2
C. Notice
Federal and state due process and equal protection clauses require
95. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, recommended by the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce in 1926, reprinted in 5 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
765 (4th ed. 1984).
96. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AT § 6 (1958).
97 See, e.g., Connell v. Brunswick, 5 A.D.2d 932, 172 N.Y.S.2d 266 (3d Dep't
1958).
98 See Talbert v. Planning Comm'n, 230 So. 2d 920, 925 (La. App. 1970); Missouri
ex rel Kramer v. Schwartz, 336 Mo. 932, 940, 82 S.W.2d 63, 67 (1935).
99. See Smart v. Lloyd, 370 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
100. See Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 34 Colo. App. 14, 19, 523 P.2d 159,
162 (1974), affid sub. nom. Colorado Leisure Products v. Johnson, 187 Colo. 443, 532
P 2d 742 (1975). See also Town of Canton v. Bruno, 36 Mass. 598, 282 N.E.2d 87, 92
(1972).
101. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-m (Consol. 1982).
102. Village of Farmingdale v. Inglis, 29 Misc. 2d 727, 727-28, 219 N.Y.S.2d 380,
381-82 (Sup. Ct. 1961), modified on other grounds and affid, 17 A.D. 2d 655, 230
N Y.S.2d 863 (1962).
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the community to give notice to affected landowners of pending zoning
enactments.1 °3 When the provisions of a state enabling statute or a
municipal ordinance fail to prescribe notice provisions that meet due
process requirements, courts have held them invalid.1"4 Even when
only substantial compliance with statutory requirements is required
and the case does not involve prejudice, some courts have held that
notice requirements are of such fundamental constitutional importance
that municipalities must strictly comply. A court may demand notice
that is greater than that required by an enabling statute if either: 1) A
local ordinance contains stricter provisions;10 5 or 2) personal service is
possible.106 Constructive rather than actual notice normally is
sufficient. 107
Following the lead of the SZEA,1°8 many state statutes require no-
tice fifteen days prior to a public hearing. Courts generally construe
the timing requirement as mandatory, and have required strict compli-
ance, even where there was a lack of prejudice.' 9 Moreover, courts
have held that this prescribed notice period must constitute "clear
days," those including neither the day of publication of notice nor the
day of the hearing."" A one-day discrepancy in the statutory notice
period often has been sufficient to invalidate a zoning enactment,"11
although one court refused, on the basis of equity, to reach a similar
103. See F.P. Plaza, Inc. v. Waite, 230 Ga. 161, 163-65, 196 S.E.2d 141, 144, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973); Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756, 759-60, S.E.2d 536, 539
(1965); Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 455, 458, 575 P.2d 1340, 1343 (1977).
104. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 384, 387, 60 P.2d 847, 850
(1936).
105. South Jonesboro Civic Ass'n v. Thorton, 248 Ga. 65, 66, 281 S.E.2d 507, 508-
09 (1981); cf. Kelly v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 439, 448, 115 A.2d 238, 245 (1955).
106. See American Oil Corp. v. City of Chicago, 29 11. App. 3d 988, 991, 331
N.E.2d 67, 70 (1975).
107. See Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 449 (1964).
108. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 96, at § 6.
109. See George v. Town of Edenton, 31 N.C. App. 648, 650, 230 S.E.2d 695, 697
(1970); Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 459, 465, 115 A.2d 238, 245 (1955).
110. See, e.g., Treat v. Plan. and Zon. Comm'n, 145 Conn. 136, 139, 139 A.2d 601,
603 (1958); Alderman v. West Haven, 124 Conn. 391, 396-97, 200 A. 330, 332 (1938);
Carson v. McDowell, 203 Kan. 40, 42, 452 P.2d 828, 829-30 (1969).
111. See, e.g., Builders Dev. Co. v. City of Opelika, 360 So. 2d 962, 964-65 (Ala.
1978); Alderman v. Town of West Haven, 124 Conn. at 396-97, 200 A at 332; Save the
Bay Committee, Inc. v. Mayor of Savannah, 227 Ga. 436, 438, 181 S.E.2d 351, 360
(1871); Breaux v. Oberlin, 247 So. 2d 195, 197 (La. App. 1971); Pyramid Corp. v.
DeSoto County Bd. of Supervisors, 366 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (D. Miss. 1973).
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result.' 12
Publication of notice in a newspaper, rather than personal service,
meets due process requirements in some cases, 113 although some en-
abling acts or local ordinances also may require mailing. Publication
must be by a specific legal notice rather than through a general news
story." 4 Courts generally hold that failure to publish a hearing notice
properly will invalidate a zoning enactment."1 5 If statutes provide for
the posting of the property that is the subject of a zoning enactment,
failure to post properly also will result in the invalidation of the enact-
ment;" 6 this includes cases in which the posted sign was smaller than
that prescribed by statute' or the posting was not close enough to the
subject property.""
Another notice concern is determining the identity of the parties en-
titled to receive notice. In addition to property owners that may be
affected significantly by a zoning enactment, enabling statutes may re-
quire that notice be sent to additional parties. These additional parties
may include adjoining municipalities and regional or state agencies.'9
Failure to provide appropriate notice to adjoining towns 120 or regional
planning commissions' 2' has resulted in the invalidation of zoning
enactments.
A final problem with notice concerns the sufficiency of the notice
112. Hallenborg v. Town Clerk of Billerica, 360 Mass. 513, 518, 275 N.E.2d 525,
530 (1971).
113. See Wanamaker v. City Counsel, 200 Cal. App. 2d 453, 458, 19 Cal. Rptr.
(1962); F.P. Plaza, Inc. v. Waite, 230 Ga. 161, 168, 196 S.E.2d 141, 144, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 825 (1973); Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 651, 122 S.E.2d 817, 821
(1961)
114. Hart v. Bayless Inv. and Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379, 346 P.2d 1101, 1108
(1959); Gendron v. Borough of Naugatuck, 21 Conn. Sup. 86, 144 A.2d 818, 823
(1958).
115. Johnson & Wales College v. DiPrete, 448 A.2d 1271, 1277-78 (R.I. 1982).
116. See Maher v. Town Plan. and Zoning Comm'n, 154 Conn. 420, 426-27, 226
A.2d 397, 400 (1967); Wright v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 174 Conn. 488, 489, 391 A.2d
146, 147-48 (1978); Baker v. Montgomery County Council, 241 Md. 178, 181, 215 A.2d
831, 834 (1966).
117. See Sirota v. Kaye Homes, 208 Ga. 113, 114, 65 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1951).
118. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Utah 2d 310, 316-18, 437 P.2d 442, 447-
48 (1968).
119. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4403(c) (1984).
120. Bohan v. Town of Southhampton, 227 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
121. Simmons v. Zoning Comm'n, 35 Conn. Sup. 246, 249, 407 A.2d 191, 194
(1979).
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itself. The United States Supreme Court has held that notice be "rea-
sonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections."' 22 In addition, the "notice must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information . . . and it
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appear-
ance." 1 23 In the context of a zoning enactment, notice must "reason-
ably [apprise] those for whom it was intended of the nature of the
pending proposal to the extent that they can determine they should be
present at the hearing."' 24 The notice "should be sufficiently specific
to warn the recipient that he may be affected by the contemplated ac-
tion and a notice deficient in this respect is no notice at all."'25 Further-
more, the notice must be comprehensible to lay persons. 126 It is
against these standards that courts measure the legal sufficiency of a
notice.
Notices must convey three types of information: 1) The identity of
the land affected by the proposed regulation; 2) the kind and quantity
of the restriction under consideration; and 3) the time and place of the
hearing.' 27 When it is not possible to identify, from the text of the
notice, the identity of the land to be affected, the zoning enactment is
void.' 28 Notices that do not state clearly the nature of the proposed
enactment may be insufficient. 129 Notices that omit information on the
hearing itself' 30 or either have failed to state the place13 ' or time' 32 of
122. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
123. Id.
124. Midway Protective League v. City of Dallas, 552 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Vizzi v. Town of Islip, 71 Misc. 2d 483, 485, 336 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (1972).
127. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 4.14 (2d ed. 1976).
128. See, e.g., Chase v. City of Glen Cove, 41 Misc. 2d 889, 993-94, 246 N.Y.S.2d
975, 980-81 (1964). But see, Chess v. Pima County, 126 Ariz. 233, 234, 613 P.2d 1289,
1290 (Ariz. App. 1980) ("Notice of a public hearing is adequate if it affords an opportu.
nity to any person, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, to determine if his property
would be affected and to what extent.").
129. See, eg., Holly Dev., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 140 Colo. 95, 102, 342
P.2d 1032, 1036 (1959); Southside Civic Ass'n v. Guaranty Sav. Assurance Co., 329
So.2d 767, 771 (La. App. 1976).
130. See, e.g., Keating Int'l Corp. v. Township of Orion, 51 Mich. App. 122, 124,
214 N.W.2d 551, 553 (1974); In re Kurren's Appeal 417 Pa. 623, 626, 208 A.2d 853,
856 (1965).
131. See, e.g., Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 140, 141, 178 S.E.282, 283 (1935).
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the hearing also may be insufficient. Although some enabling statutes
permit brief summaries of the proposed action to suffice as a public
notice,'3 3 the utilization of such summaries can lead to an invalida-
tion.' 3 4 In cases where the sufficiency of the notice is questionable,
courts will resolve doubts against the validity of the enactment, 135 but
will overlook insignificant errors or omissions.13 6 Moreover, a munici-
pality can cure an insufficient notice by republication of proper notice
within the statutory time period before the hearing. 137
D. Hearing
A hearing before the municipal legislative body prior to acting on a
zoning proposal serves three principal purposes: 1) To inform deci-
sionmakers of public opinion on policy issues; 2) to acquaint them with
specific facts concerning affected property; and 3) to give owners an
opportunity to protest decisions concerning their land.' An enabling
statute or a local ordinance that does not require a hearing may be held
unconstitutional.' 3 9 Failure of the legislative body to hold an appro-
priate hearing usually will render the enactment void. '
Courts tend to view public hearings that precede zoning enactments
132. Penlay v. Lake Harbin Civic Ass'n, 230 Ga. 631, 636, 198 S.E.2d 503, 508
(1973).
133. See supra note 69.
134. See, e.g., Wolf v. Shrewsbury, 182 N.J. Super. 289, 292, 440 A.2d 1150, 1154
(App. Div. 1981); Seyer v. Clark, 17 Ohio Ops. 2d 447, 449-50, 87 Ohio L. Ab. 108,
I10-11, 175 N.E.2d 881, 883-84 (C.P. 1961).
135. See Paliotto v. Islip, 31 Misc. 2d 447,454, 224 N.Y.S.2d 466, 476, (1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 930, 256 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1964), appeal dismissed, 16
N.Y.2d 871, 264 N.Y.S.2d 108, 211 N.E.2d 527 (1965).
136. Olsen v. City of Hopkins, 149 N.W.2d 394, 401 (Minn. 1967).
137. Johnson v. Griffiths, 141 N.E.2d 774, 777-78 (Ohio App. 1955), appeal dis-
missed, 164 Ohio St. 393, 58 Ohio Op. 188, 131 N.E.2d 397 (1955).
138. Kahn, supra note 82, at 1041, citing ANDERSON, supra note 129 at § 4.11; see
also Schaus v. Town Board of Clifton Park, 83 Misc. 2d 726, 372 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955
(1975).
139. See Masters v. Pruce, 290 Ala. 56, 63-65, 274 So.2d 33, 39-41 (1973); Dahman
v. City of Ballwin, 483 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Mo. App. 1972).
140 See, e.g., Bowen v. Story County Bd. of Supervisors, 209 N.W.2d 569, 571-72
(Iowa 1973); Bowling Green-Warren County Airport Bd. v. Long, 364 S.W.2d 167, 170
(Ky. 1962); Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 84, 299 A.2d 828, 833 (1973);
Grady v. City of St. Albans, 297 S.E.2d 424, 426 (W. Va. 1982). See also Reeves v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs 226 Kan. 397, 602 P.2d 93 (1979) (failure of township zoning board
to hold a public hearing on a proposed amendment to zoning regulations invalidated
subsequent approval of the amendment).
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as legislative in nature 41 and approve hearings conducted in an infor-
mal manner.1 42 In reviewing the conduct of public hearings, courts
generally look to the basic fairness of the proceeding to determine
whether the legislative body heard and gave fair consideration to each
speaker. 143
One particular problem with regard to hearings is whether revisions
in the proposed zoning regulation necessitate a second hearing. Minor
changes in the proposed regulation normally will not require a second
hearing;" substantial changes, however, will require a second hear-
ing. 145 While it is difficult to define what constitutes a substantive
change, one commentator has suggested that a new hearing will be re-
quired when a revision no longer comes within the scope of the original
notice. 46 Even substantial changes may not require a new hearing,
however, if they were made as a result of comments submitted at the
first public hearing. 4 7 A second hearing also may not be required
when the initial notice related to a comprehensive revision of zoning
regulations, if substantial revisions reasonably could be anticipated. 148
E. Adoption
In considering the procedural validity of final legislative approval,
this article does not examine many of the technical requirements of
voting, such as quorums, disqualifications and form. Those require-
ments usually are set out in statutes or ordinances that are not limited
141. See, e.g., 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 129, at § 4.07 (1976).
142. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687,
692-94 (Iowa 1980). Cf. Hyson v. Montgomery Court Council, 242 Md. 55, 67, 217
A.2d 578, 585-86 (1965) (requiring opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses).
143. 7 ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 50.03[2](b) (1981).
144. McGee v. Cocoa, 168 So.2d 766, 768-69 (Fla. App. 1964); Carlsmith, Carl-
smith, Etc. v. CPB Properties, 645 P.2d 873, 879-80 (Ha. 1982); St. Bede's Episcopal
Church v. City of Santa Fe, 85 N.M. 109, 111, 509 P.2d 876, 878-79 (1973); Herdeman
v. City of Muskego, 116 Wis. 2d 687, 343 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. App. 1983).
145. See, e.g., Village of Island Park v. J.E.B. Assoc., 21 Misc. 2d 249, 251-52, 190
N.Y.S.2d 77, 80-81 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Heaton v. City of Charlotte, 277 N.C. 506, 518, 178
S.E.2d 352, 359-60 (1970).
146. R. ANDERSON, supra note 126, at § 4.15.
147. See, e.g., Neuger v. Zoning Bd., 145 Conn. 625, 627, 145 A.2d 738, 741 (1958).
Cf. Summit Properties, Inc. v. Wilson, 26 Ariz. App. 550, 555, 550 P.2d 104, 108-09
(1976).
148. See, e.g., Hewitt v. County Comm'rs, 220 Md. 48, 52, 151 A.2d 144, 148-49
(1959); Desloge v. County of St. Louis, 431 S.W.2d 126, 131 (Mo. 1968).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/6
LOCAL LAND USE REGULATIONS
to zoning matters. 149 Problems have arisen, however, with regard to
the timing of legislative action. In one case, the court held invalid ap-
proval of a zoning proposal five years after the hearing,'5 0 whereas a
delay of two months was not fatal in another case. 5 ' Approval occur-
ring beyond the time period specified by a local ordinance also may be
invalid. 152
F. Post-Adoption
Many statutes require that the text and maps of any zoning enact-
ments be entered into the official minutes of the legislative body. This
requirement ensures that citizens will be able to locate an accurate ver-
sion of the regulation as adopted. Failure to enter an ordinance153 or a
map' 5 4 into the minutes has resulted in invalidation. When the omis-
sions have been viewed as insignificant and there was not uncertainty
about the text or map that had been adopted, the enactment was not
invalidated.' 5
Many enabling statutes also require the publication or posting of the
text and map of a zoning enactment, or both. Failure to meet these
requirements can result in the invalidation of the zoning enactment.'
56
In other instances, a delayed publication merely delays the effective
149. Note, however, that many statutes provide for approval by an extraordinary
majority when protest petitions have been filed.
150. See Gricus v. Superintendent & Inspector of Bldgs., 345 Mass. 687, 691, 189
N.E.2d 209, 211 (1963).
151. See Taylor v. Shetzen, 212 Ga. 101, 102, 90 S.E.2d 572, 573 (1955).
152. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 238,
390 N.E.2d 763, 770-71 (1974).
153. Addis v. Smith, 226 Ga. 894, 895, 178 S.E.2d 191, 191 (1970); City of Way-
cross v. Boatright, 104 Ga. App. 685, 687-88, 122 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1961); Keeney v.
Village of Le Roy, 22 A.D.2d 159, 162, 254 N.Y.S.2d 445, 448 (1964).
154. See, e.g., Soron Realty Co. v. Town of Geddes, 23 A.D.2d 165, 259 N.Y.S.2d
559 (1965); Keeney v. Village of Le Roy, 22 A.D.2d 159, 254 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1964).
155. See, e.g., Northern Operating Corp. v. Town of Ramapo, 26 N.Y.2d 404, 406,
311 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290, 259 N.E.2d 723, 725-26 (1973); Schroppel v. Spector, 43 Misc.
2d 290, 293, 251 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (1963); Quick v. Town of Owego, 11 A.D.2d 285,
286-87, 203 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428-29 (3d Dep't. 1960), aff'd, 8 N.Y.S.2d 1144, 209
N.Y.S.2d 828, 171 N.E.2d 903, modified, 9 N.Y.2d 649, 212 N.Y.S.2d 65, 173 N.E.2d
43 (1961); Frost v. Village of Hilshire Village, 403 S.W.2d 836, 838-39 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966). But see Ballard v. Smith, 234 Miss. 531, 537-38, 107 So.2d 580, 582 (1958)
(failure of the mayor and clerk to sign and attest the minutes of the Board of Aldermen
invalidated zoning amendments).
156. Dean v. West, 189 Neb. 518, 524-25, 203 N.W.2d 504, 508 (1973); Benigno v.
Cohallen, 40 N.Y.2d 880, 389 N.Y.S.2d 346, 357 N.E.2d 1001 (1976).
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date, but does not invalidate the enactment in its entirety.1
57
IV. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
When a court considers an enactment that does not comply with the
required statutory procedures, there are several alternative courses of
action the court may choose to take, other than to invalidate the zon-
ing ordinance.
A. Statutory Construction
Initially, a court may decide to apply new construction or alternative
reading to an existing statutory provision. A court's reinterpretation of
statutory language may bring an adoption procedure into compliance
with statutory mandates, even though the court previously would have
found it to be in violation.' 58
B. Standing
A court also may erect a threshold barrier to bringing a procedural
challenge by imposing a strong standing requirement. 159 A Texas
court, for example, held that only a property owner entitled to notice
of a change in zone may complain about the inadequacy of notice
before a zoning ordinance is adopted."'
157. Carthage v. Walters, 375 So.2d 228, 229-30 (Miss. 1979).
158. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Faria, 112 R.I. 132, 135-38, 308 A.2d 473, 475-76 (1973)
(Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance amendment and reversed the
trial court in holding that a statutory notice provision required publication in each of
three weeks rather than for a twenty-one day period, thereby overruling Rhode Island
Home Builders, Inc. v. Budlong Rose Co., 77 R.I. 147, 74 A.2d 237 (1950)); Milton v.
LeClaire, 129 Vt. 495, 496-97, 181 A.2d 834, 835 (1975) (Supreme Court of Vermont
held that jointly mailing notice to married voters satisfied the statutory requirement that
notice be mailed to each voter on the checklist of the municipality).
159. See, e.g., Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v.
City of West Palm Beach, 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1984) ("Only those persons who
already have a legally recognizable right which is adversely affected have standing to
challenge a land use decision on the ground that it fails to conform with the comprehen-
sive plan."); Brand v. Wilson, 252 Ga. 416, 417, 314 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1984) ("A citizen
must have a substantial interest, which must suffer substantial damage by reason of the
contsted zoning change."); Wilgus v. City of Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tenn.
App. 1975); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 303, 410 P.2d 764, 766
(1966) (plaintiffs suffered no disadvantage).
160. See Wells v. City of Killeen, 524 S.W.2d 735, 737-38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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C. Prejudice
An area in which there is wide disagreement among courts concerns
the necessity of finding prejudice to the complaining party. A court
sometimes raises this issue in an attempt to determine whether a proce-
dural deficiency in the adoption process constituted a substantial devia-
tion from the required procedures. A finding of no prejudice
demonstrates that a procedural deficiency is insubstantial, and the or-
dinance is found to be valid.161 Other courts simply have held that
plaintiffs whose rights have not been affected adversely by procedural
deficiencies should not be permitted to object to the validity of the zon-
ing ordinance, 162 even if there have been substantial procedural defi-
ciencies.163 Instances where courts have found no prejudice include a
delay in the performance of specified acts"M and the printing of an
illegible map.165 Other courts, however, have held that prejudice is not
a prerequisite finding for the invalidation of a zoning ordinance.1 66
Courts have used this approach when the procedural deficiency in-
volved notice requirements. 67 In addition, courts have utilized a bal-
ancing test, weighing prejudice to the plaintiff against reliance costs
incurred by others, to decide if the alleged prejudice warrants the inval-
idation of a zoning ordinance. 168
D. Waiver
Another judicial solution closely related to prejudice is waiver of
rights by the plaintiff. Again, courts are divided on this doctrine. De-
161. Mid-County Manor, Inc. v. Haverford Twp. Bd. of Comm'rs, 22 Pa. Commw.
149, 155, 348 A.2d 472, 475 (1975).
162. See, e.g., Brechner v. Incorporated Village of Lake Success, 25 Misc. 2d 920,
921-22, 208 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368-69 (1960); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d
300, 303, 410 P.2d 764, 766 (1966).
163. See Desloge v. County of St. Louis, 431 S.W.2d 126, 131 (Mo. 1968).
164. See Hopping v. Cobb County Fair Ass'n, 222 Ga. 704, 706, 152 S.E.2d 356,
357 (1966).
165. See Olsen v. City of Hopkins, 149 N.W.2d 394, 401 (Minn. 1967).
166. See George v. Town of Edenton, 31 N.C. App. 648, 230 S.E.2d 695 (1976);
Kelley v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 15 A.2d 238 (1955).
167. Hart v. Bayless Inv. and Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379, 388, 346 P.2d 1101, 1108
(1959); George v. Town of Edenton, 31 N.C. App. 648,651,230 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1976);
Kelley v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 473-74, 115 A.2d 238, 245 (1955).
168. See, e.g., Hallenborg v. Town Clerk of Billerica, 360 Mass. 513, 518, 275
N.E.2d 525, 529-30 (1971); Midway Protective League v. City of Dallas, 552 S.W.2d
170, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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fendants raise waiver most frequently when plaintiffs complain of a
municipality's failure to comply with statutory notice requirements.
The alleged noncompliance may relate either to a failure to notify all
parties entitled to receive notice, or to notice that has content deficien-
cies. A number of courts have held that when a plaintiff had received
actual notice or had appeared at a public hearing and made his con-
cerns known, or both, the plaintiff had waived his right to receive stat-
utory notice.169 Courts also may find waiver when a plaintiff did not
object to a lack of a quorum at a public hearing, 70 or failed to object to
the authenticity of written documents when introduced into evi-
dence. 71 Other courts, however, have held that plaintiff's appearance
at a hearing does not constitute a waiver of notice,172 even if the plain-
tiff is represented by legal counsel. 17
3
E. Estoppel
Estoppel, both legal and equitable, is another alternative to a court's
invalidation of a zoning ordinance. A Rhode Island court, applying
legal estoppel, held that by seeking a variance the plaintiff had admit-
ted the legality of the ordinance and therefore was estopped from
claiming that the ordinance was invalid after the municipality denied
the variance application. 74 Other courts have used equitable estoppel
to avoid invalidating zoning ordinances. This doctrine requires a court
169. See Hilton v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. App. 3d 708, 715, 86 Cal. Rptr. 754,
758-59 (1970); Pitman v. City of Medford, 312 Mass. 618, 622-23, 45 N.E.2d 973, 976-
77 (1942); Hansen v. City of Norfolk, 201 Neb. 352, 356, 267 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1978);
St. Bede's Episcopal Church, 85 N.M. 109, 509 P.2d 876, 877-79 (1973); Tulsa Rock
Co. v. Board of County Comm'ns, 531 P.2d 351, 357 (Okla. 1974); Wilgus v. City of
Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tenn. App. 1975); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17
Utah 2d 300, 303, 410 P.2d 764, 766 (1966).
170. See Croaf v. Evans, 130 Ariz. 353, 356-58, 636 P.2d 131, 134-36 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981).
171. See Agan v. Farris, 247 Ga. 236, 237, 275 S.E.2d 321, 322 (1981).
172. See Atiyeh v. Village of North Hills, 91 Misc. 2d 365, 366-68, 398 N.Y.S.2d
105, 106-07 (1977); R.I. Home Builders, Inc. v. Budlong Rose Co., 77 R.I. 147, 151, 74
A.2d 237, 238-39 (1950).
173. Bal Harbour Village v. Florida, ex reL Giblin 299 So.2d 611, 617 (Fla. App.
1974), cert. denied, 311 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1975).
174. Sweck v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 77 R.I. 8, 10-11, 72 A.2d 679, 680 (1950). See
also Farnsworth v. Town of Windsor, 24 Conn. Sup. 431,437, 193 A.2d 604, 607 (1963)
(prior application for variances estops plaintiff from claiming zoning regulations are
invalid). But see Bar Harbour Village v. Florida ex rel. Giblin, 299 So.2d 611, 617 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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to consider vested interests 175 and the expenditure of money on the
basis of zoning enactments. Although time delays were factors in the
decisions, courts have found the expenditure of sums ranging from




A final doctrine courts use to avoid invalidating zoning ordinances is
laches, which courts apply when there has been a lengthy delay be-
tween the zoning enactment and the subsequent procedural challenge.
Courts have held that delays of anywhere from ten to forty-five years
may preclude the plaintiff's claim of procedural noncompliance.' 79
A reluctance to consider such delayed action may stem from the
community's general reliance on the validity of the ordinance or from
problems of proof presented by difficulties in obtaining satisfactory evi-
dence years after the fact. While a court may not favor time delays, a
court's computation of the time of delay might begin at the point when
a plaintiff becomes aware of a possible cause of action, rather than at
the actual date of the zoning enactment.'
175. See People v. Mullstein, 54 Misc. 2d 493, 499-500, 283 N.Y.S.2d 353, 359-60
(1967), aff'd, App. Term Sup. Ct. (unreported), afid, 23 N.Y.2d 900,298 N.Y.S.2d 306,
246 N.E.2d 159 (1969).
176. See Villager v. City of Henry, 47 Il1. App. 3d 565, 568, 362 N.E.2d 120, 122
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
177. See Capps v. City of Raleigh, 35 N.C. App. 290, 299, 241 S.E.2d 527, 532
(1978).
178. See also Walker v. City of Biloxi, 229 Miss. 890, 895, 92 So.2d 227, 229 (1957)
(laches applied where city population had more than doubled and 7100 permits, reflect-
ing millions of dollars in expenditures, had been issued under the challenged ordinance).
179. City of Creston v. Center Milk Prods. Co., 243 Iowa 611, 615, 51 N.W.2d 463,
465 (1952) (21 years); Edel Filer Twp., 49 Mich. App. 210, 213-14, 211 N.W.2d 54,
548-49 (1973) (18 years); Walker v. City of Biloxi, 229 Miss. 890, 895, 92 So.2d 227, 229
(1957) (17 years); Taylor v. Schlemmer, 353 Mo. 687, 695, 183 S.W.2d 913, 916 (1944)
(14 years); Struyk v. Samuel Braen's Sons, 17 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10, 85 A.2d 279, 282-83
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1951) (10 years), aff'd, 9 N.J. 294, 88 A.2d 201 (1952); People v.
Millerstein, 54 Misc. 2d 493, 500, 283 N.Y.S.2d 353, 360 (1967) (45 years), aftd, 23
N.Y.2d 900, 298 N.Y.S.2d 306, 246 N.E.2d 159 (1969). Cf. Pilgrim v. City of Winona,
256 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn. 1977).
180. Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 455, 459-60, 575 P.2d 1340, 1344-45
(1977).
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V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
If a municipality has failed to comply with statutory procedures for
the adoption of a zoning ordinance, the municipal or state legislative
bodies may avoid judicial invalidation of the ordinance through various
actions.
A. Curative Legislation
Some states permit a municipality to reach a solution by passing a
subsequent validating statute that cures the defects in a specific zoning
enactment."" The effectiveness of such curative legislation, however,
may be limited. Courts have held that validating statutes will cure the
defective ordinance only from the effective date of the validating act.182
One court held that a validating act passed between the decision of the
trial court to invalidate an ordinance and the subsequent appeal
mooted the procedural challenge, but noted that the validating act it-
self had not deprived the plaintiff of procedural due process or vested
rights. 183
In some cases, courts have rejected the suggested validating effect of
curative legislation because of a lack of evidence showing that the mu-
nicipality passed the legislation expressly to cure a defect,' 84 or because
the validating act also failed to provide fair and meaningful notice. 8 5
A Connecticut court held that a zoning action remained void because
the alleged curative legislation did not incorporate all of the procedural
defects in the adoption process.' 86 Other courts have held that cura-
tive legislation either is ineffective to cure specific types of procedural
defects' 87 or procedural defects in general.' 8 Those decisions indicate,
181. See, e.g., Frost v. Village of Hilshire Village, 403 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. 1966).
182. See Town of Coeymans v. Malparus, 100 Misc. 2d 589, 592, 419 N.Y.S.2d 833,
835-36 (1979).
183. See County Council v. Carl M. Freeman, Assoc., 281 Md. 70, 78-80, 376 A.2d
860, 865 (1977).
184. Pilgrim v. City of Winona, 256 N.W.2d 266, 270-71 (Minn. 1977); City of
Santa Fe v. Armijo, 96 N.M. 663, 665-66, 634 P.2d 685, 687-88 (N.M. 1981).
185. V. M. Stevens, Inc. v. Town of South Hampton, 114 N.H. 118, 122, 316 A.2d
179, 182 (1974).
186. See Alderman v. Town of West Haven, 124 Conn. 391, 399, 200 A. 330, 333
(1938).
187. See, eg., Village of Island Park v. J.E.B. Assocs., 21 Misc. 2d 249, 252, 190
N.Y.S.2d 77, 81 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Coffee City v. Thompson, 535 S.W.2d 758, 766-67
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
188. Calawa v. Town of Litchfield, 112 N.H. 263, 266, 296 A.2d 124, 125 (1972);
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however, that curative legislation could validate a defective adoption
procedure under the right conditions.
B. Statute of Limitations
A second legislative remedy is the statutory limitation of action.
Statutes of limitations are the legislative correlative to the equitable
doctrine of laches.' 89 Statutes of limitations are a common legislative
mechanism for limiting the time frame within which the plaintiff must
bring his complaint. Colorado has a statute of limitations that specifi-
cally deals with the adoption of municipal charters."9 Statutes of limi-
tations that specifically apply to the adoption of zoning ordinances are
found in California,19 Delaware,'92 Massachusetts,' 93 North Caro-
lina,' 94 Vermont,' and Wisconsin. 196
Some states have general statute of limitations provisions that may
apply in challenges to the validity of a zoning enactment. For example,
Pennsylvania had a specific thirty-day statute of limitations for chal-
lenging the procedural validity of a zoning enactment, 197 but repealed
it in 1978.'9" The thirty-day appeal period, however, has been retained
under the general provisions of the judicial code,'9 9 and relates to pro-
cedural defects in the enactment of municipal ordinances, resolutions
and maps in general.
The Massachusetts provisions appear unique. First, a plaintiff filing
a challenge to the adoption procedure must, within seven days of the
commencement of such action, file a copy of the petition with the mu-
nicipal clerk." ° Second, a companion statutory provision 20 ' requires a
Olson v. Town of Litchfield, 112 N. H. 261, 262, 296 A.2d 470, 471 (1972); Drown v.
Town of Hudson, 112 N.H. 386, 388, 296 A.2d 897, 898 (1972).
189. See Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-2-218 (1977) (45 days) (applied in City of Aurora v.
Aurora Firefighters' Protective Ass'n, 193 Colo. 437, 566 P.2d 1356 (1977)).
191. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65009(b) (West Supp. 1984).
192. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8126(a) (1974) (60 days).
193. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (Mitchie/Law. Co-op. 1983) (120 days).
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-364.1 (1982) (9 months).
195. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, 4494(b) (1984) (1 year).
196. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.73(a) (West Supp. 1983) (180 days).
197. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11003 (Purdon 1972) (30 days).
198. Judiciary Act Repealer Act, 1978 Pa. Laws 202, No. 53, § 2(a) [1421].
199. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5571(c)(5) (Purdon 1981) (30 days).
200. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40A, § 5 (Mitchie/Law. Co-op. 1983).
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municipality to submit any zoning enactment to the state attorney gen-
eral for review and approval. The statute requires the municipal clerk
to submit "adequate proof that all of the procedural requirements for
the adoption of such bylaw have been complied with."20 2
Statutes of limitations also may apply to only one portion of the
adoption process. In Vermont, a defect in the form or substance of
public notice cannot be the basis for an invalidation of an enactment
unless the error is materially misleading, is the result of a deliberate or
intentional act, or if the notice fails to include one of the required ele-
ments.203 South Carolina provides a two-year statute of limitations for
challenges based on the adequacy of notice in cases where there was
substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. 2°
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The most compelling rationale for the judicial requirement of strict
compliance with statutory procedures is that of protecting the property
interests of the individual property owner. Local land use regulations
may have one of two effects on property owners. On one hand, the
imposition of new or revised zoning regulations may significantly re-
duce the potential use, and therefore, market value of the individual's
property. In determining the validity of the imposition of zoning re-
strictions under a municipality's police power, the courts generally
have not looked at the extent of loss in market value, but rather at
whether any reasonable use for the property remains. Thus, the impo-
sition of zoning restrictions often may result in substantial, uncompen-
sated losses in land value. On the other hand, another property owner,
having invested a substantial sum in the construction of a home in a
quiet, residential neighborhood, may experience a loss in the value of
the land for his purposes if zoning restrictions are relaxed and exten-
sive, nonresidential uses are allowed on adjacent property.20 5
The potential impact of zoning restrictions upon the property inter-
ests of individual property owners, and upon the general character of
the community, makes it imperative that communities adequately in-
201. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 32 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983).
202. Id.
203. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4447(c) (1984).
204. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-23-40, 6-7-730 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (time period
commences with the date of the public hearing, not the date of adoption).
205. See Kahn, supra note 82, at 1020-23.
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form their citizens of the nature of proposed zoning enactments, and
afford them an adequate opportunity to voice their views to the local
legislative body. Therefore, it seems appropriate that state statutes
provide mandatory procedural provisions that will ensure full notice to
citizens of the nature of proposed zoning enactments. Further, the ex-
tent and complexity of procedural requirements for zoning enactments
are then justifiable.
If the required procedures are to be meaningful, they must be en-
forced strictly. A judicial requirement for strict compliance provides a
bright line test for evaluating challenged procedures. The knowledge
that courts will require strict compliance also will encourage municipal
officials to follow the required procedural provisions scrupulously.
This, of course, results in the basic dilemma underlying this article-
the difficulty laypeople have in precisely and properly following each
and every procedural requirement, and the consequent potential for ju-
dicial invalidation of zoning enactments. While a procedural error in
the process of adopting a zoning enactment should give rise to a cause
of action to challenge the validity of the enactment, such an error
should not automatically result in the invalidation of the enactment.
Once such a remedy becomes possible, the court should examine the
facts in each case to determine whether an invalidation either would be
equitable or in the public interest. The most appropriate resolution of
this dilemma lies in the areas of judicial and legislative limitations on
challenges based upon procedural deficiencies, rather than in the proce-
dures themselves.
Perhaps the most promising judicial approach to ordinance invalida-
tion is that which requires the complained of action to prejudice the
plaintiff. Courts should require the plaintiff to make two showings to
prove prejudice. First, the procedural deficiency should have resulted
in actual harm to the plaintiff. Thus, if there is a deficiency in the
notice provided, but the plaintiff was aware of the nature of the zoning
enactment and the details of a public hearing, the plaintiff is not
harmed by the insufficient notice, regardless of whether he actually at-
tended the subsequent hearing. Harmless error should not be a basis
for invalidating a zoning enactment. Second, the plaintiff should be
required to have suffered personally from the claimed procedural defi-
ciency. Thus, if a plaintiff owns land that is unaffected by a zoning
enactment, he should not be permitted to challenge the validity of that
enactment. Similarly, a plaintiff that acquires a tract of land subse-
quent to the challenged enactment should be deemed to have accepted
the results of such enactment. To permit subsequent purchasers to
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protest the validity of prior zoning enactments invites the practice of
seeking procedural deficiencies to serve as a basis for a challenge of an
enactment's validity. Courts should consider purchasers to have
waived the right to challenge the procedural sufficiency of prior zoning
enactments.
The legislative alternative of a statute of limitations for procedural
challenges serves two important goals. First, a limited right to chal-
lenge the procedures of a zoning enactment will result in a certainty
that a court will not invalidate the enactment on the basis of proce-
dural deficiencies in its adoption after a stated period of time.206 This
permits reliance upon the validity of the enactment and helps to avoid
the equitable problems encountered when property owners have made
substantial investments in property on the basis of the adopted zoning
restrictions. Second, a specific statute of limitations will require poten-
tial plaintiffs to act speedily to assert their alleged procedural rights.
This permits a resolution of factual questions while the basis for such a
resolution is still available through written documentation or witness'
recollection, or both.2"' To achieve the objective of certainty, the time
period must run from the date of enactment, not from the discovery
date of the deficiency. The use of the discovery date does not result in
the desired certainty of validity.
The length of the statutory time period is a matter for legislative
discretion, but should provide a time period within which a reasonably
prudent property owner could discover a procedural deficiency. Legis-
lative provisions should ensure that there is publication of the zoning
enactment and that procedural challenges be brought within a specified
time period. The statute should not limit challenges when a plaintiff
can show fraud or intentional misrepresentation in the adoption
process.
Evaluation of the appropriateness of the judicial and legislative solu-
tions recommended in this article requires an inquiry into whether
these solutions are consistent with the two principal purposes for strict
206. A policy of finality is one of the underlying bases for a statute of limitations.
Investment Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1282
(D.C. 1977).
207. "These (statutes of limitations) ... protect defendants and the courts from
having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the
loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, dis-
appearance of documents, or otherwise." United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117
(1979).
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statutory procedures in the adoption of municipal plans and bylaws:
Limiting ultra vires actions, and ensuring procedural due process.
Neither the judicial nor the legislative remedies adversely affect the
ultra vires basis. The judicial remedies address either the status of the
plaintiff or the timing of his action, rather than the legal status of the
plan or bylaw. A court may dismiss a particular plaintiff's action for
lack of standing or for prejudice, or on the basis of waiver. estoppel or
laches. Nevertheless, a proper plaintiff, filing a timely action, may suc-
ceed in having an improper adoption process voided as being ultra
vires. Neither does the legislative remedy of a statute of limitation le-
gitimize the validity of the enactment. The ultra vires basis for a find-
ing of invalidity would still exist for a timely action.
Similarly, the procedural due process considerations do not preclude
either of these remedies. The judicial remedies of standing and preju-
dice arise in cases where the plaintiff has not suffered a property loss;
hence, due process considerations are not implicated. In a waiver case
the plaintiff has himself surrendered the exercise of his due process
rights; his deprivation thus is self-imposed. The doctrines of estoppel
and laches recognize the due process rights of the plaintiff, but resolve
the dispute, after weighing the competing interests, in favor of the mu-
nicipality and those with a vested interest in the plan or bylaw's valid-
ity. Statutes of limitation also involve the balancing of competing
interests.2° Questions raised concerning the constitutional validity, on
procedural due process grounds, of statutes of limitation have been ad-
dressed favorably by the United States Supreme Court.20 9
In a case involving due process challenges to procedures for adminis-
trative rule making,2 1° Justice Powell expressed concern about the con-
stitutionality of the thirty-day time limit for bringing an action under
the Clean Air Act.2 1' This concern apparently was resolved when
Congress increased the time period from thirty to sixty days.2 12 In
208. "Statutes of limitations... represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is
unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified time .... Id. at
117
209. Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 255 (1890) (legislature may prescribe a limi-
tation for bringing actions that is reasonable under the circumstances). See also Atcha-
falaya Land Co. v. F.B. Williams Cypress Co., 258 U.S. 190, 197 (1922).
210. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289-90 (Powell, J,,
concurring).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1970 Supp. V.).
212. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 305(b) of Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 776,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7405 (1982).
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another case subsequent to this amendment,21 3 Justice Powell appears
to have accepted the legitimacy of the sixty-day statute of limitation;
his concern was focused solely on the adequacy of the notice provisions
of the statute.2" 4 While it is difficult to assert with certainty what
might be the minimum time period required by due process to initiate a
challenge to the procedural validity of a zoning enactment, there have
been no reported court cases concerning the due process validity of the
statutes of limitation cited above.21 5
VII. CONCLUSION
This article is intended to illustrate the uncertain legal status of local
zoning enactments in municipalities throughout the country. This un-
certainty has resulted from the conflict between the statutory require-
ments needed to protect the procedural due process rights of
developers and property owners, and the inability of local municipal
officials to understand and comply fully with these complex statutory
procedural requirements. The consequent uncertain legal validity of
zoning enactments that may have been procedurally deficient in their
adoption represents an unreliable form of local land use control and an
unacceptable basis for future private investment in land development.
State courts and legislatures must adopt new approaches in this area
to achieve a reasonable balance between the conflicting interests of the
parties involved. Courts should protect the interests of developers and
property owners by requiring strict compliance with statutory notice
requirements in the enactment process. The courts should limit the
availability of this legal recourse, however, by restricting it to those
parties who can demonstrate a significant personal prejudice resulting
from improper adoption procedures. State legislatures should limit the
exposure of municipal zoning enactments to procedural challenges by
adopting reasonable statutes of limitation for zoning challenges. When
state legislatures find it inappropriate to limit procedural challenges in
some reasonable manner, they should provide for a final, timely review
of the procedures followed in a zoning enactment. Such a review, car-
ried out by an impartial third party,216 at least will provide a forum for
a determination of the status of the zoning enactment.
213. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980).
214. Id. at 594-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 190-204.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
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